The asymmetric unemployment response of natives and foreigners to migration shocks by Maffei Faccioli, N. & Vella, E.
This is a repository copy of The asymmetric unemployment response of natives and 
foreigners to migration shocks.




Maffei Faccioli, N. and Vella, E. (2020) The asymmetric unemployment response of natives
and foreigners to migration shocks. Working Paper. Sheffield Economic Research Paper 
Series, 2020008 (2020008). Department of Economics, University of Sheffield ISSN 
1749-8368 




Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 




The Asymmetric Unemployment 
Response of Natives and Foreigners to 
Migration Shocks   
Nicolò Maffei Faccioli and Eugenia Vella 
Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series 
SERPS no. 2020008 
ISSN 1749-8368 
August 2020 
The Asymmetric Unemployment Response of
Natives and Foreigners to Migration Shocks∗
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net exports and tax revenue. In the labor market, they boost persistently job open-
ings and, after a year and a half, hourly wages in manufacturing. Unemploy-
ment falls persistently for natives, driving a decline in total unemployment, while
it rises for foreigners. Our analysis disentangles the effects of job-related migra-
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economies. Using also quarterly data in a mixed-frequency SVAR, we shed light on
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What is the macroeconomic impact of migration in the second-largest destination for migrants
after the United States? In 2018, approximately 20.8 million people, or equivalently one in
four, in Germany had a migrant background according to the microcensus results of the Federal
Statistical Office (Destatis).1 Immigration is a key determinant of changes in labor supply and,
currently, the only source of population growth in the German economy, where unemployment
has remained remarkably low in recent years.2 This paper provides new macroeconometric
evidence on the expansionary effects of net migration shocks in Germany and the asymmetric
unemployment response between natives and foreigners to these shocks.
Understanding better the migration effects in the labor market and the macroeconomy is
crucial for migration policy design and can also help to curb the rise in xenophobic movements.
While a large literature has analyzed the impact of immigration on employment and wages
using disaggregate data, the migration literature in the context of macroeconometric models is
still limited due to a lack of data at high frequency over sufficiently long time. Interestingly,
such data is available for Germany. Destatis has been collecting monthly data on the arrivals of
foreigners (i.e., non-Germans) by country of origin on the basis of population registers at the
municipal level since 2006. Registration is obligatory by the registration law of March 2002
(“Melderechtsrahmengesetz”) and is necessary to obtain the income tax card required to sign
any employment contract or to issue an invoice as self-employed, and also to rent an apartment.
Using monthly data on net migration flows for the period 2006:1-2019:10, we identify net
migration shocks in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model using the Cholesky de-
composition, traditional sign restrictions and mixed (sign and narrative) restrictions. Our analy-
sis places special focus on the response of unemployment, which theoretically is ambiguous, de-
pending on various channels, for instance how fast migrants enter the labor market and whether
they do so as employed or as job seekers. In addition, if natives and immigrants are imperfect
substitutes in production, increasing inflows exert stronger labor market competition on earlier
immigrants than on natives.3 Furthermore, there is potentially a job-creation effect stemming
from the increase in both demand and labor supply, which can reduce unemployment.
We find that net migration shocks have expansionary effects in Germany, increasing in-
dustrial production, per capita net exports and tax revenue. The response of inflation appears
statistically non-significant, but a subsample analysis reveals that this result comes from a com-
bination of a positive response to job-related migration shocks from OECD countries and a
negative response to migration shocks from less developed areas of the world, such as Africa.
1A migrant background refers to having at least one parent who did not acquire German citizenship by birth.
Naturalization rates have been low so that immigrants’ offsprings often do not have the German citizenship.
2The strong decline in German unemployment from 2005 onwards and the exceptionally small increase during the
Great Recession have been associated with the earlier labor market (“Hartz”) reforms.
3Natives and immigrants are typically employed in different occupations, which makes them imperfect substitutes
in production (Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012), Llull (2018)). Usually,
immigrants (natives) have a comparative advantage in manual-intensive (language-intensive) tasks.
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In the former case, a demand effect seems prevalent while in the latter case, where migration
is predominantly low-skilled and often political in nature (including refugees), a supply effect
prevails. Furthermore, once we include Syrian flows in our baseline net migration variable, we
find that migration shocks are disinflationary, thus behaving like typical supply shocks.4
In the labor market, migration shocks boost job openings persistently and, after a year and a
half, hourly wages in the manufacturing sector, while they reduce unemployment. The increase
in vacancies highlights a job-creation effect and is in line with the inverse relation between
vacancies and unemployment typically depicted by the Beveridge curve.5 Interestingly, we
uncover asymmetric unemployment responses between natives and foreigners: unemployment
falls persistently for natives, driving the response of total unemployment, while it increases
significantly after a year for foreigners. This asymmetrical response remains robust when we
use for net migration subsamples for OECD and non-OECD countries and also when we ex-
amine data on the refugee wave from Syria, originally not included in our migration variable.
Moreover, we find that the rise in foreigners’ unemployment is reinforced in the case of pre-
dominantly low-skilled migration flows from less developed areas of the world, such as Syria
or Africa. In the latter case, this increase becomes statistically significant immediately after the
impact period. Importantly, the output and unemployment effects of migration shocks continue
to hold if we combine our baseline sample with data on net flows from Syria.
The next step is to investigate more in depth the labor market impact of net migration shocks.
Sign restrictions schemes in the literature typically restrict job-related immigration shocks to
have on impact a positive effect on labor force participation and a negative effect on real hourly
wages (see, e.g., Furlanetto and Robstad (2019)). Focusing on a wider notion of migration
(including also non-OECD countries of origin), we find that net migration shocks decrease per-
sistently the participation rate, while they increase hourly wages in manufacturing a year and
a half after the shock. Immigration can boost productivity and wages over time when firms
respond by expanding, investing, adjusting product specialization, adopting efficient technolo-
gies, and creating new businesses (Peri (2014)). While the positive response of wages is mainly
driven by OECD migration shocks, the negative participation response is driven by flows from
non-OECD countries. Generally, immigrants from Africa, Asia and South America, including
asylum seekers, do not enter rapidly into the labor force (Furlanetto and Robstad (2019)).
To gain deeper insights, we investigate also quarterly data on participation and employment
of natives and foreigners using a mixed-frequency SVAR model. The participation rate of na-
tives increases significantly after approximately two years, while that of foreigners decreases
roughly until then, driving the decrease in aggregate participation. Our results also show that
the employment rate of natives (foreigners) increases significantly for approximately two years
(one year). The positive responses of participation and employment rates for natives imply that
4For a theoretical analysis on the inflation response to immigration shocks, see, e.g., Garcı́a and Guerra-
Salas (2020).
5For the Beveridge curve in Germany, see, e.g., Figure 2 in Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019).
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the unemployment decrease for this group comes from the boost in employment and not be-
cause natives drop out of the labor market. Furthermore, the mixed-frequency SVAR exercise
provides evidence that net migration shocks also increase real hourly wages of the aggregate
economy as well as per capita GDP and investment, thus confirming the expansionary effects.
Taken together, our results highlight a job-creation effect of migration for natives and a job-
competition effect on foreigners. On the one hand, jobs can be created directly by self-employed
immigrants or entrepreneurs and indirectly by immigrant innovators (Constant (2014)). Mi-
grants often complement and rarely substitute for natives, choosing locations where they fill
shortages by accepting jobs that natives will not do. High-skilled immigrants boost techno-
logical adaptation and low-skilled immigrants foster occupational mobility, specialization, and
human capital creation. In addition, immigrants raise demand, which increases job openings.
On the other hand, the competition effect underscores the need for policymakers to address,
through redistribution, challenges faced by foreigners while ensuring that the economy benefits
from the expansionary effects of migration.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic effects of
migration.6 A strand of this literature has performed steady-state analysis with search models,
focusing on the U.S. economy. When natives and illegal immigrants serve as imperfect substi-
tutes in production and compete for jobs in the same market, Liu (2010) shows that immigration
increases the unemployment rate due to displacement (job competition) effects on natives (im-
migrants). If there are two labor markets, skilled natives are insulated from competition and can
benefit from the rise in their marginal product of labor, which decreases their unemployment. In
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), the job-creating response of firms leads to positive employ-
ment effects on natives. Under imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled inputs,
different search cost between natives and immigrants, cross-skill matching, and imperfect trans-
ferability of foreign human capital, Liu, Palivos, and Zhang (2017) find that the immigration
influx of 2000-2009 reduced the unemployment rate for all workers. Under non-random hiring,
Albert (2020) finds that the job-creation effect due to lower wages dominates the competition
effect from undocumented immigration, decreasing the unemployment rate and raising wages
for natives. Battisti et al. (2018) show that immigration has increased native welfare of both low
and high-skilled workers in 20 OECD countries. For Germany, Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019)
find that the 25% immigration increase of 2012–2016 has a negative effect on the welfare of
low skill workers in manufacturing whose unemployment rises due to competition, while all
other workers gain. Our paper empirically validates in German data the job-competition effect
for foreigners and the employment gains for natives.
Another body of literature has used SVAR models for empirical analysis (see, e.g., Furlan-
etto and Robstad (2019), Smith and Thoenissen (2019), Kiguchi and Mountford (2019)), d’Albis,
6See Vella, Caballé, and Llull (2020) for a recent edited collection.
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Boubtane, and Coulibaly (2016), d’Albis, Boubtane, and Coulibaly (2019), and Schiman (2018)).7
These studies typically highlight the expansionary effects of migration for the receiving econ-
omy, except for Smith and Thoenissen (2019) who find no statistically significant effect on per
capita GDP and Kiguchi and Mountford (2019) who show a temporary reduction. Regarding
the response of unemployment, Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) find it to be negative both for
natives and foreigners in Norway, d’Albis, Boubtane, and Coulibaly (2016) show that family
immigration reduces France’s unemployment rate, and d’Albis, Boubtane, and Coulibaly (2019)
find that the unemployment rate falls by 0.1 percentage points the year of the migration shock
and for two years after the shock. On the other hand, Kiguchi and Mountford (2019) and Schi-
man (2018) show that unemployment increases after an immigration shock in the United States
and Austria, respectively.8 To the best of our knowledge, the only previous macroeconometric
study examining the unemployment responses of natives and foreigners is Furlanetto and Rob-
stad (2019) without finding job-competition effects. Providing evidence on the participation
responses of natives and foreigners is another novel aspect of our paper.
Our aggregate time-series approach is also complementary to the large immigration litera-
ture with a microeconometric focus on the basis of disaggregate data, pioneered by the seminal
work of George Borjas (see, e.g., Borjas (2014)). Different approaches typically yield different
results, but there is some consensus that some groups of native workers benefit through their
relative complementarity with immigrants. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Man-
ning, and Wadsworth (2012) provide evidence of the role of imperfect elasticity of substitution
between natives and immigrants in the size of wage effects. Our paper is also related to studies
exploring the differential impact of immigration on natives and foreigners specifically in Ger-
many. Using administrative data and a labor-market equilibrium model, D’Amuri, Ottaviano,
and Peri (2010) show that the immigration of the 1990s had little adverse effects on native wages
and employment. Instead, it had adverse employment and wage effects on previous immigrants,
driven by a higher degree of substitution between old and new immigrants and by wage rigidi-
ties. Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2010) estimate a structural model of labor demand with
annual survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. In a counterfactual exercise with-
out restrictions for migration from new EU members before 2011, they find adverse wage and
unemployment effects for incumbent foreigners, but positive effects for natives. Finally, using
a difference-in-difference approach to assess the effect of a policy-induced migrant labor sup-
ply shock in 2016, Scharfbillig and Weißler (2019) find a negative employment effect only for
other foreign residents. In a comprehensive framework allowing also to assess the expansionary
effects of migration shocks, our paper provides new empirical evidence on the participation and
7Business cycle analysis in migration models without labor frictions can be found in Mandelman and Zlate (2012),
Smith and Thoenissen (2019), and Burriel, Fernández-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramırez (2010). In the context of
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with labor frictions, Lozej (2019) finds that immigration raises
unemployment temporarily, but the effect may subsequently switch sign if wages fall sufficiently so that firms post
vacancies. Kiguchi and Mountford (2019) stress that a temporary rise in unemployment may occur if immigration
causes non-participants to enter the pool of job seekers.
8Smith and Thoenissen (2019) do not consider unemployment in their analysis.
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(un)employment responses of natives and foreigners, while abstracting from wage effects for
each group separately because of data limitations at high frequency.
Structure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the data and
econometric model, and Section 3 discusses our baseline empirical findings. Section 4 performs
a subsample analysis for various geographical origins of migrants and also examines the impact
of the recent refugee wave from Syria. Section 5 discusses the methodology and the results of
a mixed-frequency SVAR. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we first describe the monthly data on net migration flows in Germany. Then, we
present the details of the econometric model and the identification strategy.
2.1 Monthly Data on Net Migration Flows
Since January 2006, Destatis has been collecting monthly data on the arrivals of foreigners by
country of origin, defined as the country of last residence, on the basis of population registers
at the municipal level. All geographical continents are covered (Europe, Asia, Australia and
Oceania, America, and Africa). The exact list of countries is presented in the Appendix. The
municipalities have a strong incentive to record new residents since their fiscal revenue depends
on the number of registered, while they impose penalties on non-compliants with the mandatory
registration. The difference between the numbers of arrivals and departures (de-registrations)
produces the net migration figures, also available from Destatis.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the net migration rate in Germany by various geographical
origins over our sample period 2006:1-2019:10. The net migration rate is computed as the
ratio of inflows minus outflows of non-Germans to the working-age population, multiplied by
a thousand.9 We observe a large increase during the period under study. Specifically, the total
net migration rate (cyan line) rises from close to 0% in 2009 to 0.4% in 2014 and peaks at more
than 1.8% with the refugee crisis in 2016. Notably, this significant increase is observed even
if we exclude Syrian flows, which explain the bulk of the 2015-2016 spike (green line). We
refer to this measure that is net of the Syrian flows as the baseline migration rate (blue line).
Moreover, EU migration (orange line) is a key contributor to the rise in the net migration rate
during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2014. The surge is also certainly related to
the Eastern enlargement of the EU.10 Net migration flows from OECD countries are of smaller
magnitude than those from the EU member states due to negative values mainly for Canada, the
9The data is seasonally adjusted with JDemetra+ X13, consistently with Destatis.
10In 2011 free mobility started for the EU8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia), which joined the EU in 2004, and in 2014 for Romania and Bulgaria, which
joined in 2007.
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U.S., Australia, and Japan in various years. The net migration rate from Africa peaks in 2016
at around 0.1%. Finally, between 2016 and 2018 the total net migration rate fluctuates between
0.4% and 0.6% and after 2018 it tends to get stabilized close to 0.4%, which is higher than the
level at the start of our sample.
We conduct below an in-depth empirical analysis to study the effects of the sizeable increase
in net migration on the labor market and the macroeconomy in Germany. For the main analysis,
we use the baseline migration rate (blue line), thus leaving Syrian flows out of our sample. We
examine the effects of those flows in Section 4.












Figure 1: Net Migration Rate in Germany by Geographical Origin, 2006-2019
Note: The baseline migration rate excludes Syrian flows total net flows. EU migration refers to the EU-28 exclud-
ing Germany, thus covering 27 countries. From the group of OECD countries we exclude Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico. Data comes from the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis).
2.2 Econometric Model and Identification
We consider the following reduced-form VAR(p) model:
Yt = C + A1Yt−1 + A2Yt−2 + ...+ ApYt−p + ut (1)
where Yt is a n x 1 vector containing n endogenous variables, C is a n x 1 vector of constants,
A1, ..., Ap are n x n matrices of coefficients associated with the p lags of the dependent variable
and ut ∼ N(0n,Ω) is the reduced-form residual. In the baseline model, Yt contains three vari-
ables in the following order: the net migration rate, the logarithm of the industrial production
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index, and the registered unemployment rate.11 12 To disentangle the unemployment responses
of natives and foreigners, we also run the SVAR specification by replacing the registered un-
employment rate with the unemployment of natives and foreigners. For these two variables, we
take the ratios of the number of native and of foreigners who are registered unemployed to the
economically active population (participants).
In further exercises, we add, one at a time, and order last in the system the following 8
variables using data from Destatis: population13, number of labor market participants, labor
force participation rate, number of registered vacancies, real hourly wages in the manufacturing
sector, real labor income tax revenue per capita, real tax revenues of the Federation per capita,
real net exports per capita and the CPI index. We also perform an exercise in which we substitute
the unemployment rate with the employment rate. All these variables enter in a logarithmic form
except for the participation and employment rates.
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods with a flat prior such that the information
in the likelihood is dominant. We use 3 lags of the dependent variable, which is the average
of the AIC, BIC and HQC criteria. We also use alternative lags specifications as a robustness
check in the Appendix (see Figure A.1). Let the mapping between reduced-form and structural
disturbances be ut = Sǫt, where ǫt ∼ N(0n, In) is the n x 1 vector of unit variance structural
disturbances. The model is structural in that the errors ǫt are mutually uncorrelated and have an
economic interpretation. In the baseline specification, we define S as the Cholesky decomposi-
tion of Ω, thus as the unique lower triangular matrix such that SS ′ = Ω, and give an economic
interpretation to the first shock only (see, e.g., d’Albis, Boubtane, and Coulibaly (2016)).
We interpret the migration shock as the only one that has a contemporaneous effect on the
net migration rate. Other shocks in the receiving country, which we we call “residual shocks”
without giving a formal interpretation, such as business cycle or domestic labor supply shocks,
affect net migration with a lag. While this assumption could be easily contested if we worked
with annual or quarterly data, this is not the case with monthly data. The reason is simple:
migration decisions motivated by positive conditions in the receiving country take some time
to materialize in the statistics and, arguably, one month may be thought of as a lower-bound
estimate of the period required. Let us provide an intuitive example. Suppose that someone
decides to move to Germany because of current favorable economic developments there. It
would certainly take some time before first acknowledging these developments, then taking the
decision to move, start looking for a job and temporary accommodation, and finally registering
with the authorities to be able to sign the employment contract and move to more permanent
accommodation. It is difficult to argue that this process would take less than a month and will
11This is defined as the share of registered unemployed in the economically active population. The latter is com-
puted as the sum of the number of residents in Germany who are in employment (from Destatis) and the number
of registered unemployed (from the Federal Employment Agency - “Bundesagentur für Arbeit”). The industrial
production index refers to the following sectors: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, energy and construction.
Series in logs are multiplied by 100.
12We also consider quarterly data on per capita GDP in Section 3.5 where we use a mixed-frequency VAR model.
13This variable is interpolated from quarterly data.
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be even longer for those in need of a VISA. The reverse of this example can be applied to those
leaving Germany.
As alternative identification strategy, we consider both traditional sign restrictions and more
recently proposed mixed (sign and narrative) restrictions. A SVAR approach based on sign re-
strictions allows to disentangle the exogenous and the endogenous component of immigration in
a system that fully takes into account feedback effects between different variables. Therefore, it
addresses potential concerns about the response of immigration to the host country’s economic
conditions. Recently, Antolı́n-Dı́az and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2018) developed a methodology which
allows to impose that around selected historical events structural shocks and/or historical de-
compositions agree with some narrative information. For example, it is possible to impose
that around a quarter (or several quarters) one specific shock has to be positive (or negative)
or that this shock has to be the main (or the least important) driver of a variable or more (less)
important than all the other shocks combined for a specific variable. The first is a restriction
on the sign of the structural shocks. The second and the third are restrictions on the historical
decompositions. Antolı́n-Dı́az and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2018) focus on oil and monetary shocks
and show that imposing only a few narrative sign restrictions may sharpen and even change
the inference of a SVAR originally identified via traditional sign restrictions. Our model with
net migration shocks constitutes an appropriate setup to incorporate narrative sign restrictions,
previously employed in the study of immigration shocks by Furlanetto and Robstad (2019).
Table 1 reports our signs restrictions. We restrict the migration shock to have the highest
positive impact response on net migration and a positive effect on industrial production. Alter-
natively, we make a joint use of the sign restriction that there is a positive effect on both indus-
trial production and the net migration rate and of the narrative restriction that over the period
2014-2016 immigration is the biggest contributor to the net migration rate (see Figure 1). No-
tably, the response of unemployment after migration shocks, which is ambiguous as explained
in the Introduction, is left unrestricted. The restrictions are imposed only on impact follow-
ing Canova and Paustian (2011) and are implemented using the algorithm of Rubio-Ramı́rez,
Waggoner, and Zha (2010).14
Table 1: Alternative identification strategy
Sign Restrictions
Immigration Residual Residual
Shock Shock 1 Shock 2
Net migration rate + |b21| < b11 |b31| < b11
Industrial production + + +
Unemployment rate / - +
Note: bi1 denotes the impact response of variable i to a net migration shock.
14Results (available upon request) are very similar to the ones obtained with Cholesky if we impose instead that
the migration shock explains the bulk of the variance decomposition of net migration in the first three months.
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3 Results
In this section, we present impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation net migration
shocks. The continuous lines represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded
areas indicate the 68th posterior probability region of the estimated impulse responses. The
horizontal axis refers to time periods, measured by months.
3.1 The Expansionary Effects of Net Migration Shocks
The second row of Figure 2a shows that a positive net migration shock increases persistently the
net migration rate. The effects on the German economy are clearly expansionary as industrial
production increases significantly after the first bimester and the total unemployment rate de-
creases significantly after the first quadrimester. These effects appear quantitatively important.
The first row of Figure 2a shows that the migration shock explains entirely monthly fluctuations
of the net migration rate. Regarding industrial production and unemployment, the migration
shock explains around 40% and 25% respectively. Unsurprisingly, the other shocks in the sys-
tem account for the bulk of fluctuations in industrial production and unemployment. These
results are robust to different lag specifications, harmonized - instead of registered - unemploy-
ment, and different ordering of the net migration variable (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix).
In the third and fourth rows of Figure 2a we present impulse responses when the shocks are
identified using sign restrictions. Specifically, the third row reports responses when we restrict
the migration shock to be the one with the highest positive impact response of net migration and
a positive effect on output. Recall that we leave the response of the unemployment rate to net
migration shocks unrestricted. The fourth row reports responses when we make a joint use of
the sign restriction of Table 1 and the narrative restriction that over the period 2014-2016 immi-
gration is the biggest contributor to the net migration rate, as shown in Figure 1. In both cases,
the persistent and expansionary effects of the net migration shock, namely the rise in industrial
production and the fall in the unemployment rate, are confirmed. The responses exhibit very
similar dynamics to the ones of the baseline framework, despite the use of a minimal amount of
sign restrictions. We thus feel confident to use our baseline Cholesky approach to assess next
the effects of net migration shocks on a variety of macroeconomic and labor market variables.
3.2 Asymmetric Unemployment Responses of Natives and Foreigners
Figure 2b shows the results when we augment our Cholesky SVAR with the unemployment
shares of natives and foreigners in the labor force, which replace total unemployment in the
baseline specification. The responses we obtain are asymmetric: the unemployment share of
natives decreases significantly and persistently after the first two months, while the unemploy-
ment share of foreigners increases after slightly more than a year. In terms of magnitude,
unemployment responds more strongly in the case of natives than of foreigners.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to an one-standard-deviation net migration shock



















































68% confidence bands IRF
(a) Different identification strategies in the SVAR with total unemployment


































(b) Cholesky SVAR with unemployment of natives and foreigners
Note: The continuous lines represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded areas indicate the
68th posterior probability region of the estimated impulse responses. The horizontal axis refers to time periods,
measured by months. VD denotes variance decomposition.
On the one hand, these results highlight competition effects from newly settled migrants
on earlier migrants. This dynamic competition channel has been little analyzed until now as
the literature has largely focused on the effects of immigration on natives. On the other hand,
net migration shocks have largely beneficial effects in terms of unemployment for native work-
ers, thus not confirming possible displacement effects.15 As emphasized in the Introduction,
15Figure A.2a in the Appendix shows results when we break down the pool of unemployed into natives and for-
eigners. We observe a decline for natives and an increase for foreigners in line with Figure 2b. The total pool of
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migrants often complement and rarely substitute for native workers.
We check if these findings remain robust when we use subsamples on migration flows from
OECD and nob-OECD countries and on the refugee wave from Syria in Section 4. We also
investigate further the labor market responses of natives and foreigners in Section 5.
3.3 Other Key Macroeconomic and Labor Market Variables
Immigrant workers are over-represented in manufacturing and construction jobs in Germany
(Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019)), which is the largest manufacturing economy in Europe and one
of the world’s major manufacturing powerhouses.16 In this section, we augment our baseline
SVAR with real hourly wages in the manufacturing sector, for which monthly data is available,
and also with other key variables listed in Section 2.2 (one at a time). The goal is to investigate
the impact of net migration on labor supply, labor demand, hourly wages and inflation.
Figure 3a presents the impulse response functions, while variance decompositions are in-
cluded in Figure 3b. The net migration shock increases persistently labor demand (vacancies),
the employment rate, and also real hourly wages after around 18 months. The positive response
of vacancies highlights a job-creation effect of migration and is in line with the inverse relation
between vacancies and unemployment depicted by the Beveridge curve (see, e.g., Figure 2 in
Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019)). For inflation we do not find a statistically significant effect.
Subsample analysis presented in the next section sheds light on this result.
Turning to labor supply effects, the shock leads to a protracted increase in the pool of labor
force participants 5 months after the shock, which is outweighed though by a higher rise in pop-
ulation, resulting in a short-run decrease in the participation rate. This result is in contrast to the
typical association of job-related migration shocks with an increase in participation (see, e.g.,
Furlanetto and Robstad (2019)). To understand better this result, we will conduct a subsample
analysis in Section 4 and we will also investigate, through a mixed-frequency SVAR approach,
quarterly data on participation of natives and foreigners in Section 5.
Given the positive impact on employment and wages, labor income tax revenue rises signifi-
cantly a couple of months after the shock. The response of federal total tax revenue also appears
positive 8 months after the shock. Regarding the impact on international trade, the net migra-
tion shock raises significantly net exports for more than 2 years (see Figure 3a). These findings
further corroborate the expansionary macroeconomic effects of net migration in Germany.
Finally, the variance decomposition in Figure 3b reveals that the net migration shock is
the major driver of fluctuations in population over the entire horizon considered. This finding
confirms that immigration is the main source of population growth in our sample. The effects
are non-negligible for other variables, too. Net migration explains a large share of the variance
of participants and vacancies, approximately 63% and 40% respectively, and a non-negligible
unemployed decreases in line with Figure 2a.
16Germany has an exceptionally large employment share in manufacturing (around 25% in 2014).
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Figure 3: Monthly baseline SVAR with additional variables
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(a) Impulse response functions










































Note: The continuous lines represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded areas indicate the
68th posterior probability region of the estimated impulse responses. The horizontal axis refers to time periods,
measured by months.
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share for the other variables, with the exception of the CPI index. Altogether, these findings
stress the role of net migration in macroeconomic and labor market volatility.
4 Geographical Origins of Migrants and the Refugee Wave
Empirical evidence suggests that the average education level of immigrants from developed
and developing countries differs. In addition, so far we have not used data on the wave of
predominantly low-skilled refugees from Syria, which increased immigration flows in Germany
to about one million people in 2015 - 2016 (see also Figure 1). In this section, we study the
effects of net migration shocks accounting for the geographical origin and the impact of refugee
migration. To this end, we estimate the SVARs of Figure 2a (second row), Figure 2b and Figure
3 by changing the first variable to the net migration rate originating from the region of interest,
namely EU countries, OECD countries, Africa, and Syria.17 We also show findings when we
add Syrian flows to the baseline migration variable used until now.
Figure 4 shows responses for the net migration rate, industrial production, total unemploy-
ment rate, and the unemployment shares of natives and foreigners. Results remain qualitatively
unchanged in all cases. Net migration shocks from EU and OECD countries have very similar
effects (columns 1 and 2). In the case of net migration from Africa (column 3), the nega-
tive response of total unemployment is no longer statistically significant, while the increase of
foreigners’ unemployment becomes statistically significant shortly after the impact period and
stronger in magnitude compared to both columns 1 and 2 and to Figure 2b. When our net migra-
tion variable includes only Syrian flows (column 4), the effects remain qualitatively the same,
but loose statistical significance for industrial production and total unemployment, while they
do maintain it for natives’ and foreigners’ unemployment. Importantly, all our results continue
to hold and are statistically significant when we combine data on Syrian flows with our baseline
data sample for net migration (column 5).
Figure 5 presents responses for the participation rate, vacancies, hourly wages in manufac-
turing, inflation, and net exports.18 The negative response of the participation rate in Figure
3a is mainly driven by non-OECD economies (Africa or Syria), whereas the response is not
statistically significant for net migration from OECD countries and is negative and significant
only for nearly the first half of the time horizon for net migration from EU countries. As men-
tioned in Furlanetto and Robstad (2019), immigrants from Africa, Asia and South America are
mostly those who do not enter rapidly into the labor force (as is the case for asylum seekers, for
example). The positive response of vacancies is very robust in all cases shown in Figure 5. The
positive response of hourly wages in the second half of the time horizon in Figure 3a is con-
firmed here for net migration from OECD (and EU) countries. The response of the CPI index
17Results for net migration flows from Asia are mainly driven by Syria and therefore look very similar. Net flows
from South America were found to be little relevant for our analysis. Both sets of results are available upon
request.
18Responses for population, participants, federal and wage tax revenues are included in Figure A.3 of the Appendix.
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68% confidence bands IRF
Note: Total migration results from augmenting the net migration variable used in the baseline SVAR with net flows from Syria. The continuous lines represent the posterior
























































































































68% confidence bands IRF
Note: Total migration results from augmenting the net migration variable used in the baseline SVAR with net flows from Syria. The continuous lines represent the posterior




is also insightful. Recall that the inflation response in Figure 3a was not statistically significant.
The subsample analysis shows that this is explained by a positive response to OECD (and EU)
migration shocks and a negative response to African and Syrian migration shocks. This finding
suggests that for the former a demand effect is prevalent, while for the latter a supply effect.
Once we include Syrian flows in our baseline net migration variable (column 5), we observe that
migration shocks appear to decrease the CPI index, thus behaving like typical supply shocks.
The response of net exports is also interesting. While net exports increase on impact and for a
couple of months in the case of OECD (and EU) migration shocks, the response is substantially
more muted if we examine African or Syrian migration.
Overall, the analysis in this section disentangles the effects of job-related migration from
OECD countries and predominantly low-skilled migration (including refugees) from less de-
veloped economies. This distinction matters qualitatively for the effects on inflation and quan-
titatively for participation, hourly wages, foreigners’ unemployment and net exports.
5 Deeper Insights from a Mixed-Frequency SVAR
So far, we have shown that the participation rate falls after net migration shocks, but we have
not examined the responses of natives and foreigners separately. Since data on participation
(and employment) by nationality is available quarterly, in this section we proceed with a mixed-
frequency SVAR. This approach allows us further to explore quarterly data on per capita con-
sumption, investment, GDP, and real hourly wages for the aggregate economy.
5.1 The Model and Data
The main advantage of the mixed-frequency SVAR model is that we can assess the effects of net
migration shocks on variables for which data is available at quarterly but not monthly frequency,
while keeping our identifying restrictions unchanged. Estimation is carried along the lines of
Schorfheide and Song (2015).
We complement the three variables of our baseline Cholesky SVAR (net migration rate,
industrial production, unemployment rate) with (a) the participation rate and the logarithm of
employed workers, as they convey relevant information to properly estimate the model, and (b)
the following quarterly variables of interest (one at a time): participation rate of natives, partici-
pation rate of foreigners, the number of participants natives (in logs), the number of participants
foreigners (in logs), the employment rate of natives, the employment rate of foreigners, real
hourly wages for the total economy, per capita real consumption, per capita real investment,
and per capita real GDP. We specify a flat rather than Minnesota prior in line with our monthly
SVAR model and we include 6 lags of the dependent variable to ensure enough feedback.19
19This might cause some impulse responses in 6a to gyrate. With a smaller number of lags, impulse responses
are less robust especially if we exclude variables from the system. Results with 6 lags, instead, are robust even
17
Figure 6: Mixed-Frequency SVAR











































68% confidence bands IRF
(a) Impulse response functions










































Note: The continuous lines represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded areas indicate the
68th posterior probability region of the estimated impulse responses. The horizontal axis refers to time periods,
measured by months.
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Data by nationality on the number of employed is available from the Eurostat’s Labor Force
Survey (LFS). By taking the sum of the numbers of employed and registered unemployed for
natives and foreigners, we obtain a measure of native and non-native participants, respectively.
We construct the employment rate by nationality by taking the corresponding ratio of the num-
ber of employed to the number of participants. Since population data distinguishing Germans
and non-Germans is not available quarterly to compute participation rates by nationality, we rely
again on the LFS data. Real hourly wages are defined as hourly gross wages and salaries from
Destatis, deflated by the CPI index. The remaining macroeconomic variables (consumption,
investment and GDP) are taken from the Destatis and FRED databases.
5.2 Participation and Employment Responses of Natives and Foreigners
Figure 6a shows impulse responses for the quarterly variables to a net migration shock. The
participation rate of natives increases significantly after approximately two years, while that of
foreigners decreases roughly until then, driving the decrease in the aggregate participation rate
over the same period in Figure 3a. This result suggests that newly settled migrants enter the
labor market only gradually, which can explain why it takes time for foreigners’ unemployment
to increase significantly in Figure 2b. As a result, the immediate rise in population outweighs
the rise in total participants (Figure 3a).
Figure 6a also shows that the employment rate of natives (foreigners) increases significantly
for approximately two years (one year). For natives, this increase coincides with an increase
in participants. The participation and employment responses imply that the unemployment de-
crease for natives in Figure 2b is due to a boost in their employment following the net migration
shock and not because natives respond by dropping out of the labor market. Possible displace-
ment effects of net migration on natives are not found here.
For foreigners, the magnitude of the increase in the employment rate is roughly double com-
pared to natives.20 Over the same period, the number of foreigners’ participants does not move,
which matches well the initially insignificant response of foreigners’ unemployment share in
Figure 2b. The increase in the pool of foreigners participants a year after the shock is roughly
ten times higher compared to natives, marking the gradual integration of newly settled immi-
grants in the labor market. As a result, foreigners’ participation rate returns now to its pre-shock
level after declining during the first year after the shock. This leads to stronger competition for
jobs and higher unemployment among foreigners (see Figure 2b).
In terms of variance decomposition, Figure 6b shows that net migration is an important
driver of fluctuations in participation for foreigners, but less relevant for natives. The aggregate
importance of net migration for participation is thus almost entirely driven by foreigners.
without participation and employed workers in the specification.
20Figure A.2a in the Appendix shows that the response of employed natives appears smaller in magnitude than that
of foreigners, while Figure A.2b shows that the responses of participants and employment rate for foreigners and
natives do not change if we use unemployment data from the LFS instead of the Federal Employment Agency.
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5.3 Responses for Aggregate Wages, Consumption, Investment and GDP
Figure 6a shows a significant and protracted increase in real hourly wages of the aggregate
economy. Together with the positive response of hourly wages in the manufacturing sector in
Figure 3a, our results indicate that, on average, net migration does not depress but, instead,
boosts wages in Germany. The response of per capita investment is also statistically significant
and positive for almost a year after the shock. A similar result, with higher statistical signifi-
cance, is obtained for per capita GDP.21 The response of per capita consumption is also positive
but slightly significant (i.e., from month 10 to 17-18). The results from the variance decom-
position in Figure 6b show that net migration shocks contribute to variability in hourly wages
and per capita GDP, while they explain a small share of fluctuations in per capita consumption
and investment. Overall, these results add to the positive responses of industrial production and
per capita net exports and tax revenue from the monthly SVAR model, further confirming the
expansionary effects of migration shocks in Germany.
6 Conclusion
The recession induced by the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to have long, deep, and pervasive
consequences. Considering also that migrants have been among the most vulnerable groups to
infection, the sanitary and economic crisis could exacerbate xenophobic sentiments around the
world. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the migration effects in the labor
market and the macroeconomy, which is crucial for migration policy design and for the effort
required to curb the rise in xenophobic movements.
Using monthly and mixed-frequency SVAR models applied to data for Germany, we show
that net migration shocks are expansionary, increasing persistently per capita output, invest-
ment, net exports and tax revenue. Shocks to net migration from OECD countries appear to
be inflationary, reflecting demand forces, while the opposite is true for non-OECD migration
shocks, for which supply-side effects are mostly prevalent.
In the labor market, migration shocks increase (over time) real hourly wages. The partici-
pation rate of foreigners decreases, driving a decrease in the aggregate participation rate, while
that of natives increases. Migration shocks also boost new hirings and decrease the unemploy-
ment rate, in line with the inverse relation depicted by the Beveridge curve. Interestingly, we
uncover asymmetric responses for the unemployment of natives and foreigners. Natives’ unem-
ployment decreases persistently, driving the response of total unemployment, while foreigners’
unemployment increases. Newly settled migrants mainly from non-OECD countries enter the
labor market at relatively slow pace. Our results highlight a job-creation effect of migration
for natives and a job-competition effect for foreigners, which can be rationalized by imperfect
substitutability of the two labor inputs in production. Job competition effects for foreigners are
21Figure A.4 in the Appendix plots the estimates of monthly GDP from the mixed-frequency SVAR.
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stronger in the case of predominantly low-skilled migration from non-OECD countries. With
respect to wage effects for natives and foreigners, our study is unfortunately limited by the lack
of data at high frequency. We leave theoretical investigations as a topic for future research.
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A List of countries in the migration flows dataset of Destatis
OECD countries. Destatis provides data for European OECD countries as a whole. We also
consider Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea Republic, New Zealand, and the United States.
We thus do not include Chile, Colombia, Mexico.
EU countries (as of July 2013). Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom.
Other European countries. Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland,
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Russian Federation, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, Rest of Europe.
Africa. Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Cote d’lvoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Central
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Dem. Republic of Congo, Libya, Morocco, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Rest of
Africa.
America. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mex-
ico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Rest of America.
Asia. Afghanistan, Arab Republic, Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, the People’s Republic of Ko-
rea, Democratic Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Rest of Asia.
Australia and Oceania. Australia, New Zealand, Rest of Oceania.
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B Bayesian estimation of the VAR model
Consider the reduced form VAR model presented in Section 2.2:





The process above can be stacked in a more compact form as follows:
Y = XB +U
where:
1) Y = (Yp+1, ..., YT )
′ is a (T − p) x n matrix, with Yt = (Y1,t, ..., Yn,t)
′.
2) X = (1,Y−1, ...,Y−p) is a (T − p) x (np + 1) matrix, where 1 is a (T − p) x 1 matrix of
ones and Y−k = (Yp+1−k, ..., YT−k)
′ is a (T − p) x n matrix.
3) U = (up+1, ..., uT )
′ is a (T − p) x n matrix.
4) B = (C,A1, ..., Ap)
′ is a (np+ 1) x n matrix of coefficients.
Vectorizing the equation above, we obtain:
y = (In ⊗X)β + u
where y = vec(Y), β = vec(B), u = vec(U) and u ∼ N(0,Σ⊗ IT−p).
Given the assumption of normality of the reduced-form errors, ut ∼ N(0,Σ), we can express
the likelihood of the sample, conditional on the parameters of the model and the set of regressors
X, as follows:







(y − In ⊗Xβ)
′(Σ⊗ IT−p)
−1(y − In ⊗Xβ)
}
Denote β̂ = vec(B̂), where B̂ = (X′X)−1X′Y is the OLS estimate, and let S = (Y −
XB̂)′(Y −XB̂) be the sum of squared errors. Then we can rewrite the likelihood as follows:
























We can compute the posterior of the parameters given the data at hand using Bayes rule, as
follows:
















This posterior distribution is the product of a normal distribution for β conditional on Σ and an
inverted Wishart distribution for Σ. Thus, we draw β conditional on Σ from:
β|Σ,y,X ∼ N(β̂,Σ⊗ (X′X)−1)
and Σ from:
Σ|y,X ∼ IW (S, v)
through Gibbs sampling, where v = T − p− np− 1.
C Robustness checks and additional results
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68% confidence bands IRF
Note: In column 3, we replace the registered unemployment rate with harmonized unemployment. In columns 4 and 5, the net migration rate is ordered in the SVAR second
to last and last, respectively. The continuous lines represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded areas indicate the 68th posterior probability region of the
estimated impulse responses. The horizontal axis refers to time periods, measured by months.
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6
Figure A.2: More impulse response functions to an one-standard-deviation net migration shock































68% confidence bands IRF
(a) Additional variables in the monthly SVAR




























68% confidence bands IRF
(b) LFS data in the Mixed-Frequency SVAR
Note: The continuous lines represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded areas indicate the
68th posterior probability region of the estimated impulse responses. The horizontal axis refers to time periods,
measured by months. In the bottom panel, variables are constructed as explained in Section 4.1, using both
employment and unemployment data from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
27

























































































68% confidence bands IRF
Note: Total migration results from augmenting the net migration variable used in the baseline SVAR with net flows from Syria. The continuous lines represent the posterior




Figure A.4: Estimated monthly GDP (in logs)
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